SDA Sandžak has gone from a party that brought together all Bosniaks in the 1990s and represented a kind of popular movement to a party that is today the weakest of the three Bosniak parties and which, according to many forecasts regarding the upcoming elections, finds itself in a very challenging situation.

In the previous analysis devoted to the results of Bosniak parties in the upcoming parliamentary elections, the author of this text correctly determined that the Bosniak parties would not reach an agreement on a joint electoral appearance, but would instead run independently. That prediction came true, and all three Bosniak parties will run independently in the parliamentary elections.

SDP and SPP have already submitted their signatures, while SDA is still collecting signatures to submit its electoral list. There is also a certain possibility that SDA could withdraw from the race and support the Student List, which might allow it to preserve a certain position within the Bosniak political body. However, for now this is not an option, because SDA is already actively collecting signatures for the submission of its list.

This text attempts to analyze what brought SDA from a once-powerful political movement supported by almost all Bosniaks in Sandžak to the third-ranked party among Bosniaks.

SULEJMAN UGLJANIN AS A CAUSE OF SDA’S DECLINING SUPPORT

The first and fundamental cause, and at the same time the party’s defining feature, is its president from its founding to the present day, Sulejman Ugljanin, who played a key role in the erosion of support for the Party of Democratic Action.

Above all, the authoritarianism within the party negates the very word “democratic” in its name. The party is organized in a highly authoritarian manner, and almost all decisions are made by the party president himself. Ugljanin’s constant conflicts within the party, as well as the dozens of officials who have left it, support the claim that over the years almost all of its more significant figures have abandoned the party. A large number of former SDA officials identify Sulejman Ugljanin’s character as one of the greatest obstacles to working within the party.

His vanity and arrogance have often been problems encountered by former officials and associates. Sulejman Ugljanin primarily values those who unquestioningly accept his opinion, while anyone who even slightly opposes the president’s decisions is harassed and marginalized.

This brings us to another issue, namely the influence of Sufism on Ugljanin’s understanding of politics.

SDA IS NOT A TEKKE, BUT A POLITICAL PARTY

Sufism and tasawwuf are teachings that certainly belong to the spiritual heritage of Bosniaks and that have, for decades, significantly influenced politics and the shaping of the character of certain Bosniak politicians. However, there is one enormous difference: a political party functioning in the twenty-first century cannot function like a tekke, because the political conditions in which parties and other organizations operate have changed significantly.

SDA cannot be a tekke in which Ugljanin pretends to be some kind of sheikh while everyone else is his disciple who listens to him unquestioningly. Even if Ugljanin wanted to establish such a relationship within the party, one of the fundamental principles of Sufism stands against him, the struggle against one’s own nafs, which is diametrically opposed to the vanity and arrogance that Ugljanin, according to his critics, often displays.

Therefore, if Ugljanin wants to be a sheikh, he is free to retire, open a tekke and teach people Sufism and tasawwuf there. A political party is a secular organization, and a democratic party in particular cannot tolerate a leader whose opinion must be obeyed unquestioningly. On the contrary, a democratic political organization advances through the exchange of opinions, internal debate, confrontation of different views and the possibility of questioning the decisions of the president and leadership.

THE INFLUENCE OF STATE POLICY AND SYSTEMIC SUPPORT FOR PARTIES WILLING TO COOPERATE WITH STATE AUTHORITIES

Since the introduction of multiparty politics, Serbian state policy has been such that it supports candidates and parties that are not as “nationally colored”, meaning those that do not emphasize the Sandžak question as strongly but instead advocate the fastest possible integration of Bosniaks. However, integration here should also be understood as a possible form of pressure on Bosniaks to abandon the memory of the genocide in Srebrenica, as well as the memory of various forms of political torture to which, according to available data and testimony, around 17,000 Bosniaks in Sandžak were subjected during Milošević’s regime.

In exchange for forgetting these crimes and forms of torture, projects, infrastructure and state investment are offered, which are, again, still far below what is needed. SDP and Rasim Ljajić benefited the most from this kind of state policy, because they dealt almost not at all with the issues of crimes and political torture from the 1990s.

When material investment is used as a substitute for confronting crimes and political torture, space opens for the public interest to be reduced to the relationship: “the state provides projects, while local political elites provide political support.” In such a system, decisions about who receives projects, jobs and state funds can become the subject of political bargaining, increasing the risk of clientelism and corruption. Institutional accountability is pushed aside, while political loyalty and political connections can become more important than transparent criteria for the distribution of public money.

This is also how SDP grew to its current level of political support, through clientelism and employment in public institutions, especially schools, in exchange for silence on national issues. SPP, on the other hand, emerged as a party from the Islamic Community and was built around different narratives, particularly those concerning religious issues and the state’s relationship with the Islamic Community. SPP also has certain elements of clientelism within its political structure, but they are far from the scale available to SDP.

It should also be kept in mind that Rasim Ljajić became and remained a minister in Belgrade while his party did not have a single councilor in Sandžak municipalities, and that a significant part of state resources was directed toward supporting SDP. Therefore, the weakening of SDA’s support was certainly influenced by state support for parties that were willing to “remain silent” on national issues, crimes and political torture.

EQUATING SDA WITH BOSNIAK IDENTITY

While SDA was the most influential party among Bosniaks in Sandžak, support for SDA was considered a kind of identification with Bosniak identity, while almost everything outside SDA was regarded as treacherous and renegade. At that time there was no need to insist particularly on Bosniak unity because it was assumed that being a Bosniak was the same as being an SDA voter.

Today the situation has changed. SDA is the weakest of the three Bosniak parties and no longer has a monopoly over the political representation of Bosniaks. Precisely because of this, the story of unity is increasingly invoked, because SDA and Ugljanin see in that unity, meaning a joint list, a form of political salvation and a possibility of survival.

Today, everyone who is against “unity” is effectively presented as being against Bosniaks. Ugljanin thus continues his political technique from the 1990s, except that the categories of “traitors” have changed: in the past they were those outside SDA, while today they are everyone who does not support a joint Bosniak list.

However, voters increasingly recognize this approach for what it is, political hypocrisy. When the call for Bosniak unity is used primarily as an instrument for preserving the political position of one party or its leadership, such a call loses its mobilizing power. Instead of bringing voters together, it pushes them even further away from SDA.

SDA HAS LOST NOVI PAZAR AS A POLITICAL STRONGHOLD

Novi Pazar, as the city with the third-largest Bosniak population in the Balkans, immediately after Sarajevo and Zenica, is particularly important for the political identity of Bosniaks. For several electoral cycles now, SDA Sandžak has been steadily weakening, without any signs that it could recover. SDA is now also the third-ranked party in Novi Pazar, the most important city for Bosniaks in Sandžak and one of the most important cities for Bosniaks in the Balkans.

Although SDA still has significant influence in Tutin and Sjenica, the loss of Novi Pazar may be its hardest blow in practical political terms. The largest Bosniak population lives here, and the greatest share of political power in Sandžak is drawn precisely from political control over Novi Pazar. By losing Novi Pazar, SDA has gradually begun moving toward becoming a party whose vote total is closer to the results of parties gathering Serbs than to that of a party representing the dominant Bosniak electorate.

An important note is that, according to the latest projections, Serbs make up less than 15% of the population that actually lives in Novi Pazar. How significant this shock is for SDA and how important Novi Pazar is can be seen through the results of SDA BiH in the City of Sarajevo and the City of Zenica, cities that have larger Bosniak populations than Novi Pazar.

In all elections, municipal, cantonal, federal and state-level, SDA of Bosnia and Herzegovina has been either the first- or second-ranked party, never the third. Even though Bosnia and Herzegovina has several parties pursuing national politics and SDA could lose some support in these areas, such a decline has never led to its complete political marginalization.

Here we can see a clear difference between SDA BiH and SDA Sandžak, namely a difference in the degree of institutional and political organization. SDA in Bosnia and Herzegovina is a more serious and broader political organization that is not so closely tied to the image and work of a single man. In Sandžak the situation is completely the opposite. An equality sign has long been placed between SDA and Sulejman Ugljanin, and Ugljanin himself has contributed to that to a great extent.

THE “OVERCOAT OF THE 1990s” AND POLITICS IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY

Critics of SDA and Sulejman Ugljanin very often say that he is a man who has remained trapped in the 1990s, in the war years, and that he simply does not understand contemporary political currents. This, however, is a rather foolish and unfounded thesis, because Serbia in 2026 does not differ significantly in certain important elements from Serbia during Milošević’s regime. Nationalism remains the dominant political narrative, war criminals are glorified, and the position of Bosniaks remains problematic.

The reason voters do not support Ugljanin, at least when it comes to this issue, is actually very simple: they simply no longer believe that he and SDA genuinely represent the politics they speak about.

In other words, the idea SDA talks about is not itself the problem. A large part of the Bosniak public considers these issues important and legitimate. However, a large part of Bosniaks no longer sees Ugljanin, or anyone from SDA, as a political actor capable of substantively and credibly representing those ideas.

The consequence is also significant voter apathy in elections, particularly in elections for the Bosniak National Council. SDA’s idea, meaning its basic political ideology, is not necessarily outdated. The problem lies with the people who represent it today, they are no longer trusted.

WEAKENING WITHIN THE BOSNIAK NATIONAL COUNCIL

The establishment of the Bosniak National Council and the development of this body of Bosniak national self-government cannot be separated from SDA. However, SDA came third in the last elections and thereby lost this stronghold as well. Although this may not mean much in practical terms, symbolically it represents another step toward SDA’s political marginalization and possible disappearance from the political scene.

For several decades, the Bosniak National Council was considered a kind of political property of SDA, and among citizens the BNV and SDA were very often almost equated with one another. Today the situation is completely different. SDA can no longer independently control the BNV, and the next elections could further weaken its position and lead to the loss of an even larger number of voters.

The BNV elections are scheduled for 8 November, while the parliamentary elections are scheduled for 25 October. Thus, an already weakened SDA is entering parliamentary elections in which it is very possible that it will win one or even no MPs, especially if turnout is higher. If SDA performs poorly in the parliamentary elections, it will be very difficult for it to persuade voters to turn out for the BNV elections, which normally attract considerably less interest.

SDA will almost certainly win a certain number of councilors within the BNV, but it remains questionable whether it can achieve a result similar to what it once achieved. The fact that SDA is today marginalized even within the BNV represents another sign of its possible disappearance from the political scene or its reduction to minor political activity, similar to certain Bosniak parties in Polimlje.

THE EXHAUSTION OF THE POLITICAL NARRATIVE

The next reason for SDA’s weakening is the fundamental exhaustion of the political narratives through which the party dominated for decades. National rights, autonomy for Sandžak and the representation of Bosniaks in political life are ideas that have formed the basis of SDA’s political activity for almost 40 years.

However, after so much time, it is logical that voters begin asking how many of those goals have been achieved and whether SDA has genuinely contributed to improving the position of Bosniaks in Serbia. When confronted with these questions, SDA itself and its officials often panic and resort to the old, well-known formula: accusations, attacks and declaring political opponents traitors.

Quite simply, declaring everyone who criticizes SDA a traitor has become so outdated and distasteful that most citizens no longer even react to it. Such rhetoric was once a powerful political weapon, whereas today it increasingly looks like a sign of an inability to provide answers to the questions voters are asking.

Ultimately, the question also arises whether Sulejman Ugljanin himself truly believes such rhetoric when he accuses political opponents or critics of SDA of betrayal, or whether it has become merely a mechanism for preserving political position and discipline within his own party.

POSSIBLE SURVIVAL THROUGH SUPPORT FOR THE STUDENT LIST

Finally, we come to the option mentioned at the beginning of the text, which could save SDA from possible disappearance from the political scene. At a moment when both SDP and SPP have registered for the parliamentary elections and undoubtedly possess significantly greater resources, SDA’s participation in the elections looks more like a suicide mission than a rational political choice. The only political move that could save SDA at this point would be to withdraw from the parliamentary race, support the Student List and direct all of its resources toward the BNV elections.

As a kind of referendum atmosphere develops in Serbia, FOR or AGAINST Vučić, and as an increasing number of parties withdraw from the elections and support the Student List, parties that nevertheless participate are increasingly viewed as “SNS satellites”. In such an environment, SDA would find it very difficult to explain that it is indeed an opposition party and that it will not be “taking” votes away from the students.

If SDA withdrew from the elections and supported the Student List, it could enter the BNV elections with the message that SDP and SPP are regime lists and that SDA alone is anti-regime. In such a situation, within the broader referendum-like atmosphere, voters who support the Student List in the parliamentary elections could decide to support SDA in the BNV elections. In such an atmosphere, SDA could even approach its 2018 result, when it won more than 40% of the vote.

However, rational decision-making has never been the stronger side of either the Party of Democratic Action of Sandžak or Sulejman Ugljanin. The author can only conclude that SDA will probably choose, as countless times before, the worst possible option and participate in both the parliamentary and BNV elections.

In the parliamentary elections, their opponents are neither SNS, SDP nor SPP, but the Student List itself. SDA could therefore very easily find itself in conflict with supporters of the Student List in Sandžak. However, analyses, proposals and advice have certainly never been particularly well received within SDA Sandžak, which is one of the reasons why they find themselves today in the situation they are in, as guardians of hopelessness.

Probably on some subconscious level, both Sheikh Ugljanin himself and his political murids chose the term “guardian” rather than leader, builder, strength or something else. Guardians protect something from destruction, something they consider valuable. I fear, however, that the only valuable thing they actually possess is hopelessness, which could potentially lead them toward permanent disappearance from the political scene.

DOES THE IDEA OF BOSNIAKS’ POLITICAL RIGHTS DISAPPEAR WITH SDA?

The possible disappearance or certain marginalization of SDA from the political scene in Serbia is certainly not bad only for Ugljanin and the small number of officials who have remained around him, but also for one important political idea among Bosniaks, the idea of Sandžak autonomy, as well as preserving a certain kind of historical memory of the torture and crimes to which Bosniaks were subjected during the 1990s.

Perhaps with SDA ceasing to exist as a politically relevant actor, the centuries-old desire of the Serbian state will finally be fulfilled, to obtain its own “Serbian Muslims”, like those the Kingdom of Yugoslavia had in Bosnia, who had religious rights but almost no political influence.

Perhaps this is precisely the political future awaiting Bosniaks in Sandžak, to finally become loyal Serbian Muslims who will not demand any additional economic, political or cultural rights.

If that happens, those most politically responsible for such an outcome will certainly be Sheikh Ugljanin and his political murids.